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Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states’
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Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover,
it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the ‘Lux-
embourg Compromise’, the ‘Demographic Clause’, and the ‘Ioannina Compromise’)
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I Introduction
The power of EU member states in the Council is a recurring topic in debates of EU treaty reforms
and has been extensively studied in the literature.1 And while the relevance of power indices is still
subject to debate in the academic literature2, anecdotal evidence suggest that they have played a
non-negligible role in the political bargaining process preceeding the treaties of Nice and Lisbon.
Moreover, Kauppi and Widgren (2007) find that voting power explains almost 90 percent of the
variance in budget shares for the EU member states between 1976 and 2001.
The present paper provides a comprehensive reassessment of the consequences of treaty changes
and (EC) EU enlargements on the power of EU member states, the EU’s capability to act (effi-
ciency), and the proportionality of the voting mechanism, focusing on the EU Council of Ministers.
Apart from the Banzhaf (1965) and Shapley and Shubik (1954) measures, we use alternative in-
dices that have been suggested in the literature: the Johnston (1978) index, the Deegan and Packel
(1978) index, the Holler and Packel (1983) index, and the inclusiveness index (Nevison et al., 1978;
Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger, 2000).
Regarding efficiency we use Coleman’s (1971) measures of countries’ power to initiate and
prevent action, which are based on the assumptions underlying the Banzhaf approach, as well
as Shapley-Shubik based efficiency measures recently introduced by Paterson (2005). The overall
proportionality of the voting system will be judged in terms of the power gradient (Paterson,
1998; Paterson and Sila`rszky, 1999), a non-parametric measure that resembles the Gini-index and
will be calculated for each of the power indices.
Unlike previous studies, which mainly focus on a treaty-to-treaty comparison (see, for in-
stance, Le Breton et al., 2012; Algaba et al., 2007; Bilbao et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2002; Hosli
1995), we start from the original six EC member states (treaties of Rome) and consider each
regime shift (treaty change or enlargement) till the Treaty of Lisbon that came into force in 2009
and foresees changes in the voting procedures as of 2014.
Moreover, we account for the EU accession of Croatia, which took take place on 1 July 2013, and
consider the effects of possible EU enlargements by Turkey as well as further candidate countries
(Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro).
Finally, we also judge the relevance of additional legal provisions that have been in place in
addition to the standard qualified majority voting regime, namely the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’,
the ‘Demographic Clause’, the ‘Ioannina Compromise’, as well as more recently introduced enforce-
ment mechanisms under the revised Stability and Growth Pact such as reverse qualified majority
voting. Since these extra and new rules have been largely ignored in the quantative literature so far,
it is worth exploring the implied changes in our measures of power, efficiency, and proportionality.
The probabilistic interpretation of power indices (Straffin, 1977) reveals that the Banzhaf and
the Shapley Shubik index both rely on strong distributional assumptions (such as independence
and homogeneity). More recently, Paterson (2005) has shown that these assumptions can be stated
equivalently in terms of the distribution of the voting polls (i.e., the distribution of the number of
member states in favor of the proposal). As we show in the paper, these assumptions have strong
implications, e.g., for measuring the EU’s efficiency (capability to act).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly defines the measures
of power, efficiency, and proportionality. Section III describes the ‘rules of the game’ in the EU
Council of Ministers from 1958-2017 (and beyond) and provides quantitative results for the measures
of power, proportionality, and efficiency. The final section summarizes the results and concludes.
1 See e.g. Widgren (2009) for a survey of the literature.
2 See, e.g., Garrett and Tsebelis (1999), Albert (2003) for a critical review of power indices.
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II Measures of Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality
In the following we define the quantitative measures of power, efficiency, and proportionality that
will be calculated for the EU Council of Ministers for the period from 1958-2014 (2017) and there-
after. We start by considering the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices (and the related Coleman
indices), which are still the most widely used measures of power, and then turn to the definition of
a number of modified measures (Johnston, Deegan-Packel, Holler-Packel, Inclusiveness index) that
have been suggested in the literature.
1. Notation and Definition of the Power Indices
Throughout we assume a ‘yes-no’ voting system, where an assembly N of n different players may
vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ under certain rules that determine under which conditions a proposal is
adopted. In a weighted voting system each player is assigned a specific number of votes. A group
of players (actors) voting with ‘yes’ is called coalition. A particular voting outcome is referred to
as S. The number of yes-votes is given by ‖S‖. Such a coalition is a ‘winning coalition’ if their
‘yes’-votes lead to the passage of a proposal under the rules of the game. Finally, we refer to the
outcome of a voting process, expressed as number of players in favor of the proposal (s) as voting
poll.3
1.1. Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI)
The Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of player i is defined as the number of orderings (permutations)
of players for which i is pivotal (in the sense that it turns the coalition into a ‘winning coalition’),
divided by the total number of possible orderings of players. For player i, we have
SSIi =
∑
S⊂N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})] (1)
where S is a coalition (one particular voting outcome), s is the number of players forming the
coalition S, and ν is a function so that ν(S) = 1 if S is a winning coalition, and ν(S) = 0 otherwise.
Hence, the summation in the numerator is over all winning coalitions where the removal of player
i makes them losing, which we call negative swings. By construction, it holds that
∑n
i=1 SSIi = 1.
1.2. Banzhaf Index (BFI)
Banzhaf (1965) measures the power of a player i by the number of times player i is ‘critical’
without considering orderings. The absolute Banzhaf index4 of player i is defined as the the sum
of all negative swings for i, divided by the number of coalitions including i (whether winning or
not):5
BFIai =
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})]
2n−1
(2)
3 This is to be distinguished from the voting result: Depending on the rules of the game a particular voting
poll may lead to acceptance or failure of a proposal.
4 The idea of the Banzhaf index was firstly introduced by Penrose (1946).
5 For notational simplicity, the obvious dependence of the indices on the rules of the game, reflected in the
function ν, is omitted in the following.
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Notice that the absolute Banzhaf index does not sum to 1. Its normalized variant is given by
BFIi =
BFIai∑n
j=1BFI
a
j
. To make the indices comparable, we will consider only normalized variants
in the following, unless mentioned otherwise.
1.3. Coleman Indices of Power to Prevent (CPI) and Initiate Action (CII)
Alternative measures of voting power, which are closely related to the Banzhaf index have been
suggested by Coleman (1971). The power of player i to prevent action is the likelihood that member
i turns a winning coalition into a losing coalition and is defined by the number of potential negative
swings divided by the number of winning coalitions:
CPIai =
∑
S∈N [ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})]∑
S∈N ν(S)
, (3a)
and its normalized variant is given by CPIi = CPI
a
i /
∑n
j=1CPI
a
j .
The power of player i to initiate action is the likelihood that member i turns a losing coalition
into a winning coalition, i.e., the number of positive swings divided by the number of losing subsets
(the complement to the number of winning coalitions):
CIIai =
∑
S∈N [ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})]
2n −∑S∈N ν(S) , (3b)
and the normalized version is given by CIIi = CII
a
i /
∑n
j=1CII
a
j .
Notice that while the Banzhaf index does not distinguish between power to prevent action and
power to initiate action, it differs from the two Coleman-measures only by a scaling factor6. As a
consequence, the normalized variants of these three indices are equal.
Finally, Coleman (1971) also suggests a measure of the overall decisiveness of a voting body,
given its size, its decision rules and the weights of its members. The capability of a voting body to
act (also referred to as efficiency) is defined as fraction of coalitions that are winning coalitions:
EBFI =
∑
S∈N ν(S)
2n
. (4)
The subscript BFI indicates that the efficiency measure by Coleman relies on the same probabilistic
assumptions as the Banzhaf index as will be outlined in more detail below.
1.4. Johnston Index (JNI)
Johnston (1978) modifies the Banzhaf index in order to account for the argument that a measure
of power should depend on the number of critical players (swingers) in a coalition, because a player
will be more powerful if he or she is the only critical player. The Johnston score (or absolute
Johnston index) is given by:
JNIai =
∑
S⊆N
S3i
1
κ(S)
[ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})], (5)
where κ(S) denotes the number of critical players in a winning coalition S and S 3 i denotes that
player i is part of the coalition S. The normalized Johnston index is then obtained as JNIi =
JNIai /
∑n
j=1 JNI
a
j .
6 In particular, it holds that BFIai = CPIi
∑
S∈N ν(S)/2
n−1 = CIIi(2n −
∑
S∈N ν(S))/2
n−1 .
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1.5. Deegan-Packel Index (DPI)
Deegan and Packel (1978) introduced their power index based on the assumption that only minimal
winning coalitions should be considered when determining the relative power of voters. A minimal
winning coalition is a coalition where each player is ‘critical’, i.e., if any of the players leaves the
coalition, it will not be a winning coalition anymore. Deegan and Packel state that if players are
rational and have perfect information, they will not form coalitions with players that they do not
need to win the vote, i.e., they will only form minimal winning coalitions (Deegan and Packel,
1978).
Furthermore, they assume that all minimal winning coalitions form with equal probability and
that the amount of power a player derives from belonging to some minimal winning coalition is
the same as that derived by any other player belonging to that same minimal winning coalition.
Formally, the (absolute) Deegan-Packel index is defined as
DPIai =
1
m(ν)
∑
S∈M(ν)
S3i
1
s
[ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})], (6)
where M(ν) is the set of all minimal winning coalitions, m(ν) is the number of minimal winning
coalitions, and S 3 i denotes that player i is part of the minimal winning coalition. The normalized
variant is given by DPIi = DPI
a
i /
∑n
j=1DPI
a
j .
1.6. Holler-Packel Index (HPI)
Holler and Packel (1983) argue that distributing the value of coalitions among their members might
not be adequate if the coalition value is a collective good. They thus propose the ‘Public Good
Index’, a modification of the Deegan-Packel index where all critical players in a minimal winning
coalition also get all the ‘spoils’. The absolute Holler-Packel index is given by
HPIai =
1
m(ν)
∑
S∈M(ν)
S3i
[ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})], (7)
and the normalized variant is HPIi = HPI
a
i /
∑n
j=1HPI
a
j .
Hence, the Holler-Packel index differs from the Deegan-Packel index just by the fact that it
does not take into account the number of players in the minimal winning coalition.
1.7. Inclusiveness Index (INC)
Nevison et al. (1978) introduced the Zipke index which is equal to the absolute inclusiveness index
proposed by Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger (2001). It is meant to capture the expected gains from future
decision-making and defined as
INCai =
∑
S∈N,S3i ν(S)∑
S∈N ν(S)
(8)
where ν(S) = 1 if S is winning. In other words the inclusiveness index is defined as actor i’s number
of participations in winning coalitions in relation to the number of all feasible winning coalitions. In
contrast to the other power indices introduced above, the inclusiveness index thus does not measure
the decisiveness of an actor (for example by being ‘pivotal’ or ‘critical’), but simply his inclusion
in winning coalitions. Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger (2000) argue that both decisiveness and inclusiveness
should be taken into account when calculating power. Again a normalized variant can be defined
as INCi = INC
a
i /
∑n
j=1 INC
a
j .
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2. Power Indices: A Probabilistic Statement
In the following we give a probabilistic interpretation of the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index,
following Straffin (1977). The virtue of this approach is that it makes explicit the distributional
assumptions underlying the measurement of power and allows a derviation of ‘Shapley-Shubik
analogs’ to ‘Banzhaf-like’ efficiency measures.
Straffin (1977) focuses on the distributional assumptions regarding actors’ voting behavior.
More recently, Paterson (2005) gives an alternative probabilistic interpretation of power indices,
focusing on the probability distribution of voting outcomes (voting polls) rather than voting be-
havior. As already mentioned above, voting polls are expressed as number of actors in favor of the
proposal, ranging from 0 to n (0 to 1).
Following Paterson (2005), we define the power of an actor as expected decisiveness (δi) of his
or her vote for a given distribution of the voting polls:
δi =
n∑
s=0
di(s)p(s). (9a)
Decisiveness di(s) of player i in a particular poll (0 ≤ s ≤ n) is the share of combinations (coalitions),
that are ± swing votes for player i. In formal terms, consider the outcome sets Ss with exactly s
players in favor of the proposal. Moreover, define S∗i = S \ {i} if i ∈ S and S∗i = S ∪ {i} if i 6∈ S.
Then
di(s) =
1(
n
s
) ∑
S⊆Ss
|ν(S)− ν(S∗i )|. (9b)
Note that deciciveness (di) depends only on the parameters of the voting game, not on any proba-
bilistic aspects, and is thus identical under the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik approach. Also note
that di can be decomposed into positive and negative swings. In particular, it holds that the
decisiveness di is the sum of the positive decisiveness (d
+
i ) and negative decisiveness (d
−
i ):
di = d
+
i + d
−
i , (10)
where d+i =
1
(ns)
∑
S⊆Ss [ν(S)− ν(S \ {i})] and d−i = 1(ns)
∑
S⊆Ss [ν(S + {i})− ν(S)].
The voting poll distribution is described by the density function p(s), s = 0, ..., n , which assigns
a probability of there being s votes in favour (and n − s against it). The Banzhaf index assumes
that the voting polls have a binomial distribution, with probability 1/2, i.e.,
pBFI(s) =
(
n
s
)∑n
s=0
(
n
s
) = (n
s
)
1
2n
, s = 0, ..., n. (11a)
Hence, the Banzhaf approach assigns a probability close to zero to voting polls close to unanimity.
The Shapley-Shubik index assumes that all voting polls are equally likely and have a uniform
distribution over the interval 0 to n, i.e.,
pSSI(s) =
1
(n+ 1)
, s = 0, ..., n. (11b)
Hence, in terms of voting polls, the two indices can be defined as (See Paterson, 2005, Theorem 1):
BFIai =
n∑
s=0
di(s)pBFIa(s), and (12a)
6
SSIi =
n∑
s=0
di(s)pSSI(s). (12b)
Expected decisiveness (the two indices) can be additively decomposed into a positive swing balance
(δ+i ) and a negative swing balance (δ
−
i ), both under the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik assumptions:
δi = δ
+
i + δ
−
i , with δ
+
i =
∑n
s=0 d
+
i (s)p(s) and δ
−
i =
∑n
s=0 d
−
i (s)p(s).
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The approach by Paterson (2005) is closely related to the one by Straffin (1977), which focuses
on the distribution of voting behavior over all voting constellations, given by p′(S) = p′(s), where
s = ‖S‖. Given the assumptions of the SSI and the BFI, we have
p′SSI(S) =
1
(n+ 1)
1(
n
s
) = (n− s)!
(n+ 1)
s!
n!
=
(n− s)!s!
(n+ 1)!
, (13a)
p′BFIa(S) =
1
2n
(13b)
and the power indices can be written equivalently as8
SSIi =
∑
S⊂N
|ν(S)− ν(S∗i )|p′SSI(S), (14a)
BFIai =
∑
S⊂N
|ν(S)− ν(S∗i )|p′BFIa(S) (14b)
As outlined in the following, the Coleman measures are derived under the assumptions of the
Banzhaf approach. Paterson (2005) also suggests a Shapley-Shubik analog of the capability to act
(efficiency, E) based on the following generalized, encompassing concept of efficiency (E), defined
as the probability of coalitions being winning coalitions:
E =
∑
S⊂N
ν(S)p′(S). (15)
Using the distributional assumptions of the Banzhaf approach, the familiar Coleman measure given
in equation (4) above is obtained.
EBFI =
∑
S⊂N
ν(S)p′BFIa(S) =
∑
S⊂N
ν(S)
2n
. (16a)
The Shapley-Shubik analog is given by
ESSI =
∑
S⊂N
ν(S)p′SSI(S) =
∑
S⊂N
ν(S)
(n− s)!s!
(n+ 1)!
. (16b)
Under Shapley-Shubik assumptions, it turns out that efficiency is equal to the sum of the positive
swing balances over countries or 1 minus the negative swing balance (see Paterson, 2005, Theorem
2):9
ESSI =
n∑
i=1
δ+SSI,i = 1−
n∑
i=1
δ−SSI,i. (17)
7 Note that the positive and negative swing balance are the same under the Banzhaf approach, but not
under Shapley-Shubik assumptions.
8 Here the summation is across all voting constellations rather than all voting polls.
9 This symmetry result does not hold for the Banzhaf approach.
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By analogous reasoning, a generalized index of the power to prevent action or blocking leverage
(PIi) can be defined:
PIi =
δ−i
E
. (18)
Under the Banzhaf assumptions, Coleman’s measure to prevent action (CPIi) is obtained. The
Shapley-Shubik analog is given by (see Paterson, 2005, Theorem 3):
SPIi =
δ−SSI,i
ESSI
=
δ−SSI,i∑n
j=1 δ
+
j
. (19)
3. The Overall Proportionality of a Voting System
Apart from the individual power of single actors, a question of interest relates to the proportionality
of a voting system. A natural approach is to compare countries’ normalized power indices with
their population shares. A summary measure of the differences between countries’ voting power
and their population share, referred to as power gradient (PG), has been suggested by Paterson
(1998) and Paterson and Sila`rszky (1999). It can be defined for any power index and provides a
convenient summary measure of the proportionality of a voting system, whose evolution can be
traced over time.
Figure 1: Illustration of Power Gradient (BFI, EU27, 2007-10/2014)
The concept is best illustrated graphically. In Figure 1, the EU27 countries are arranged in as-
cending order of population size. The three lines plot the cumulative sum up to member state i of
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voting power under three assumptions: equal power of each member state (one-country, one-vote),
actual power of each member state (as defined by any normalized power index, in Figure 1 the
normalized Banzhaf index for the current regime, EU27, qualified majority voting, see below for
more details), and proportional power of each member state (in terms of its population share).
The power gradient is defined as the area between the equal-power line and the actual-power
line, divided by the area between the equal- and proportional-power line. It is equal to zero, when
all players have equal power, and it is equal to 1 if the countries’ (normalized) power indices are
equal to their population shares.
Arranging the players in ascending order of countries’ population shares (pi), the power gradient,
based on any normalized power index (PI), is defined as
PGPI =
∑n
i=1 pi(1− 2i+ (Ii + Ii−1)n)
−n+∑ni=1 pi(2i− 1) , (20)
where pi is the population share of country i and Ii is the cumulative sum of the respective power
index up to country i.
III Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality: Results for
the EU Council of Ministers
Summing up the discussion in Section II, the following quantitative measures will be considered for
the case of the EU Council of Ministers over the period 1958-2014 (and beyond):
Country-specific power indices: Banzhaf (BFI), Shapley-Shubik (SSI), Coleman power to
initiate and prevent (CPI, CII), their Shapley-Shubik analogs (SPI, SII), Johnston (JNI),
Deegan-Packel (DPI), Holler-Packel (HPI), and inclusiveness (INI). Note the all indices as used
in the following are normalized such that they sum to one.
Indices relating to the EU Council of Ministers as a whole: efficiency in terms of Coleman’s
capability to act (EBFI) and the Shapley-Subik analog (ESSI) and the proportionality of the voting
system, i.e., the power gradient implied by each (country-specific) power index.
1. Voting Rules in the EU Council of Ministers
The indices will be calculated for all regimes (countries’ voting weights and majority rules) in place
since the establishment of the European Communities by the treaties of Rome in 1957 (in force
1958) till the latest revision through the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Table 1 gives an overview of the
regimes in place.
1.1. Voting Weights and Majority Requirements in the EU Council of Ministers
Till the reform through the Treaty of Lisbon, a qualified majority weighted voting regime has been
in place in the EU Council of Ministers. Thereby, each member state is assigned a certain number
of votes and a certain threshold (around 70 percent) is required for the passage of a proposal (see
the third column of Table 1).
The weighting of votes will be abolished as of March 2017 due to the Treaty of Lisbon and
replaced by a double majority system. Then each vote has the same weight (’one country, one
vote’) and a qualified majority will require i) 55% of the EU member states (comprising at least 15
member states) of the Council representing 65% of the population of the EU. A blocking minority
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requires i) either 13 members or ii) the votes of at least four Council members (Art 16 para 4 TEU)
altogether representing more than 35% of the population of the EU. According to Article 3 para 2
of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon (Protocol No 36) a transitional
rule applies between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 2017. Within this period of time upon request
by one member state the former procedure shall be applied (255 out of 345 weighted votes).
Table 1: Voting Rules in the EU Council of Ministers, 1958-2017 (and beyond)
Regime Time period Rules, Treshold Further Legal Provisions
EC6 1958-1972 QMV, 12 of 17 (70.6%) Luxemburg Compromise, 1966-1987
EC9 1973-1980 QMV, 41 of 58 (70.7%) Luxemburg Compromise, 1966-1987
EC10 1981-1985 QMV, 45 of 63 (71.4%) Luxemburg Compromise, 1966-1987
EC12 1986-1994 QMV, 54 of 76 (71.1%) Luxemburg Compromise, 1966-1987
EU15 1995-04/2004 QMV, 62 of 87 (71.3%) Ioannina Compromise I, 1995-4/2004
EU25 05/2004-10/2004 QMV, 88 of 124 (71.0%) -
EU25 11/2004-2006 QMV, 232 of 321 (72.3%) Demographic Clause, 11/2004-4/2017
EU27 2007-10/2014 QMV, 255 of 345 (73.9%) Demographic Clause 11/2004-4/2017
EU27 11/2014-3/2017 QMV / DMV (transition) Ioannina Compromise II, 11/2014-3/2017
EU27 4/2017- DMV Ioannina Compromise III, 4/2017-
Notes: EC ... European Communities, EU ... European Union, QMV ... (weighted) qualified majority
voting, DMV ... double majority voting (55% of member states, 65% of population).
As can be seen from the overview in Table 1, regime shifts took place either through enlargements
of the EC (EU) or treaty revisions. Detailed information on the country-specific number of votes
is given in Appendix A1. The results for the regime under the Lisbon Treaty will be given for
the EU27 as well as for the EU28, including Croatia that joined the EU in 2013 before the Lisbon
Treaty will come into force. In addition we will consider the consequences of possible further EU
enlargements by the four remaining candidate countries (Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey),
based on the double majority voting procedure and the population projections for 2020.
In the calculation of the power indices, it will be assumed throughout that all EU member
states participate in the voting and vote either in favor or against a proposal, i.e., there are no
abstentions. We regard this as most relevant and representative case, since it is reasonable to
assume that countries will make full use of their voting power, in particular when important issues
are at stake.10
Obviously, the complex and multifacted procedure of EU legislation comprises more than qual-
ified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, which limits the generality of our results. First,
the EU Council of Ministers usually adopts legislative proposals by the EU Commission (or the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) in co-decision with the
European parliament. With the Treaty of Lisbon, co-decision with the Parliament has become the
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ and thus the norm for most policy areas. It is based on the principle
of parity and means that neither institution (European Parliament or Council) may adopt legisla-
tion without the other’s assent. Hence, by focusing on voting power in the Council, the (equally
strong) role of the European Parliament is not considered.
Second, while Article 16 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that the Council shall
act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise and qualified majority
10Notice that under qualified majority voting, abstentions are counted as votes against a proposal, but are
effectively the same as voting ‘no’. On the other hand, abstentions do not prevent the adoption of an act
by unanimity (Article 238(4) TFEU).
10
voting has been extended steadily since the Single European Act in 1987, there are still matters
requiring an unanimous vote, in particular in the intergovernmental ‘second pillar’ (foreign and
security policy) and ‘third pillar’ (police and judicial cooperation) of the Treaty on European
Union. Moreover, in (exceptional) cases, where the Council does not act on a proposal by the
Commission or the High Representative, different (higher) thresholds than those stated in Table 1
apply under qualified majority requirement (Article 238 TFEU). On the other hand, there are also
important policy areas where the qualified majority requirements are less stringent than the ones
in Table 1, namely under the excessive deficit procedure, where a reverse qualified majority voting
procedure has been recently introduced for the adoption of enforcement measures. Some special
cases of interest where the rules of the game differ will be considered in Section III.3. below.
Finally, due to the so-called ‘culture of consensus’ in the Council, proposals typically only reach
the voting stage if most of the initial conflicts between countries have been resolved (Heisenberg,
2005). However, while formal voting power cannot explain the interaction between the all relevant
‘players’ and describe the political negotations preceeding the actual voting, it is certainly an
influential determinant of EU member states’ bargaining power at all stages of preparing and
taking decisions (through so-called ‘shadow voting).
Hence, notwithstanding the complexity of the process of EU legislation, the ‘standard qualified
majority voting procedure’ summarized in Table 1 can be reasonably regarded as (maybe its single
most) important element, and as predominant and most representative case for the part of EU
legislation taking place in the EU Council of Ministers.
1.2. Additional Formal and Informal ‘Rules of the Game’
Apart from the standard voting rules given in Table 1 underlying the definition of the (function
ν in the) aforementioned power indices, there have been (are) additional legal provisions in place
affecting the power of EU member states and the EU’s efficiency (see the remarks in the rightmost
column of Table 1). In the following these legal details and their treatment in the quantitative
analysis will be discussed in more detail.
1.2.1. Luxemburg Compromise (1966-1987)
The so-called ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 29 January 1966 is an informal agreement, stating
that when a decision was subject to qualified majority voting, the Commission would postpone a
decision if any member state felt that very important interests were at risk. Under an extreme
interpretation, this compromise assigns each member state a veto right and thus have equal power
as under an unanimity requirement.
However, the prevailing view is that the Luxembourg Compromise is only a political declaration
which did not amend the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community or other Treaties,
leaving the Council’s legal powers fully intact (Dashwood, 1992). Moreover, the Single European
Act did not mention the compromise anymore and since then qualified majority voting was gradually
extended to more and more areas.11 Hence the Luxemburg compromise can be argued to have been
informally in place only until 1987. Another line of argument is that the Luxembourg compromise
has never really been repealed and is still available as a sort of a threat that could still be invoked.
11Furthermore, the adoption of Council’s Rules of Procedure (20 July 1987) expressly provided that the
Council has to vote on the initiative of its president who is, furthermore, required to open voting proceedings
on the invitation of a member of the Council or Commission, provided that a majority of the Council’s
members so decides. See the Amendment of the Council’ s Rules of procedure adopted by the Council on
20 July 1987, on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty of 8 April 1965 establishing a Single Council and a
Single Commission of the European Communities [15 October 1987] OJ L291.
11
Borchardt (2010), for example, argues that France relied on it in 1993 and 2008, and Poland in
2006, but according to Calliess and Ruffert (2011), it has become obsolete due to the Lisbon Treaty.
As a consequence the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ will not be considered as a hard fact and thus
ignored in the calculation of the power indices below, though it has to be borne in mind when
interpreting the results. In principle its relevance might reemerge insofar as one member state
(especially if it is a large one) invokes important interests (Kapteyn, Verloren and van Themaat,
1990; Wyatt and Dashwood, 1990). At least it has established a ‘culture of consensus’ in the
Council of Misters and close voting decisions are still rather the exception than the rule.
1.2.2. The Ioannina Compromise
The Ioanninan Compromise dates back to an informal meeting of the member states’ foreign min-
isters in March 1994 in the Greek city Ioannina.12 They agreed on a voting mode beyond the letter
of the law, attenuating the requirements for a blocking minority.
Ioannina I (1995-4/2004)
The informal Ioannina Compromise from March 1994 was adopted as a Council decision in April
1994. In cases in which the opposing minority has only between 23 and 25 votes, the Council shall
do ‘all within its power to reach, within a reasonable time and without prejudice to obligatory time
limits laid down by the Treaties and by secondary legislation ..., a satisfactory solution which could
be adopted by at least 68 votes’.13 To put it negatively, no more than 19 votes should be cast
against this ‘satisfactory solution’. This agreement has got superseded by the new weighting of
votes in the Council as a result of the Eastern enlargement of 2004 and was thus repealed in May
2004.14 Then it was out of force over a period of 10 years, but has been reintroduced in modified
form through the Lisbon Treaty as of March 2014.
Ioannina II (11/2014-3/2017)
The new agreement (referred to as Ioannina II) is annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon as Declaration
No 7. It stipulates that for the time from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 the following rule
applies: If at least 3/4 of the population required for a blocking minority (3/4 × 35% ∼ 26.3%) or
at least 3/4 of the number of members states required for a blocking minority (3/4 × 13 ∼ 10 for
the EU27; the same for EU28) ‘indicate their opposition’ to the Council decision, the Council shall
discuss the issue (Art 1). To this end, the Council shall do all in its power to reach a ‘satisfac-
tory solution’ (Art 2) ‘within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time limits’,
arguably around 3 months (Deja and Baddenhausen, 2007; Baddenhausen et al. 2007). Although
not explicitly defined, ‘satisfactory’ can be arguably understood as ‘unanimous’. As a consequence,
als the Ioannina Compromise II waters down the requirements for a blocking minority providing
member states with additional delaying power.
Ioannina III (04/2017- )
From 1 April 2017, the 3/4 threshold watering down the requirements for a ‘blocking minority’ is
further reduced to 55%, i.e., as of then a ‘delaying minority’ requires only 0.55× 35 ∼ 19.3% of the
population or 0.55 × 13 ∼ 8 member states for the EU 27; also for the EU28; Art 4). Notice that
whether the four members’ threshold (in addition to > 35%) provided for in Art 16 para 4 TEU
12For an account of the original Ioannina Compromise, see Peterson and Bomberg (1999).
13Council Decision of 13 April 1994 [1994] OJ C105/1, amended by [1995] OJ C1/1.
14Since the Ioannina Compromise (1994) is explicitly referring to the number of total votes given in a Union of
15 and to the thresholds for QMV and blocking minority respectively, the agreement was repealed as soon
as further countries acceded the Union (that is by May 2004); this was expressly foreseen in declaration
No 50 to the final act of the conference adopting the Amsterdam Treaty.
12
needs to be considered as well (75% of 4 would be 3; 55% would amount to 3 as well), is not clear
from the wording of Declaration No 7, which does not mention it at all.
It should be added that, in contrast to the original Ioaninna compromise, the scope of the
reintroduced Ioannina Comprise (Ioannina II and III) is strongly limited, since it is only applica-
ble to procedures in which the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or the
High Representative (Article 238 para 2 TFEU), i.e., it does not apply to the ordinary legislative
procedure.
Overall, the Ioaninna Compromise gives additional delaying power to member states, on top of
the standard power to prevent action as captured by the power indices. Implementing the lower
requirements for a blocking minority in the function ν (see Section II) is straightforward. However,
since the Ioaninna compromise involves delaying rather than preventing power only and does not
apply to the ordinary legislative procedure, it is not included in the calculation of the standard
indices, but its consequences will be considered separately below.
1.2.3. Demographic Clause (11/2004 - 4/2017)
In contrast to the Luxembourg and Ioannina Compromise, the ‘Demographic Clause’ is a hard
legal fact directly amending the requirements for the adoption of a proposal and involves blocking
rather than only delaying power. According to Article 12 para 1(b) of the Treaty of Athens15 the
following rule applies: If a decision was adopted by a qualified majority it shall be verified upon
request of one member of the Council whether the qualified majority is representing at least 62%
of the total population of the EU (so-called ‘Demographic Clause’, later on inserted into Article
205 TEC). If this threshold turns out not to have been met, the decision shall not be adopted.
According to Article 12 para 1(b) of the Accession Act 2003 the Demographic Clause takes effect
as of 1 November 2004 and shall be perpetuated until 1 April 2017 (for the time from 1 November
2014 to 1 April 2017 only upon request by at least one member state). Since the Demographic
Clause can be invoked at any time upon request of a single EU member state, it directly affects
voting power and it will be accounted for in the calculation of the power indices for the period
from 11/2005-5/2017. Specifically, this will be reflected in the function ν (see Section II), such
that a coalition is only defined as winning if it exceeds the required voting threshold of 62 percent.
Nevertheless, we will also evaluate its relevance by calculating power indices under the same regime
for the hypothetical situation without the ‘Demographic Clause’ in place.
2. Basic Results
In the following we report the basic results from the calculation of the power measures defined in
Section II from Rome to Lisbon. We start by considering country-specific results and then turn
to measures for the EU Council of Ministers as a whole (efficiency, proportionality). Finally,
we consider the relevance of the aforementioned additional legal provisions and more recently
introduced voting regimes such as reverse qualified majority voting.
15Against this background, Article 3 para 1(a) ii) of the Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union
(Protocol No 10) which equally provides for a new distribution of votes, though starting from 1 January
2005 only and not including the ten new member states after the Eastern round (169 votes + majority
of members of the Council) appears to be irrelevant. Also Declaration No 20 to the Treaty of Nice has
not been followed regarding the date of the entry into force of the new weighing of votes. Whereas the
Declaration, just as Protocol No 10, claims this to be the 1 January 2005, the Treaty of Athens provides
for the 1 November 2004.
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2.1. Country-Specific Results
Tables 2 and 3 show of the (normalized) Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for EU member
states under various regimes since the treaties of Rome. Detailed results for all other indices
(JNI,CII, CPI,DPI,HPI, and INC) under the various regimes are reported in Appendix A1
(along with countries’ population shares) and their similarities and differences compared with the
results from the BFI and SSI will be discussed below. The indices given in Table 2 and 3 and
Appendix A1 fully account for the Demographic Clause (but not for the Ioannina Compromise
whose role will be considered separately below).
For the transitional regime during the period 11/2014-3/2017, during which both regimes will
be in place (QMV and DMV), results for the EU27 are given for the DMV regime only, since the
power indices under qualified majority voting are the same as those for the EU27 in the period 2007-
10/2014.16 Since Croatia will join the EU on 1 July 2013, the results for the period as of 2014 are also
reported for the EU28 including Croatia (under DMW using the population projections for 2015,
since the voting weights of Croatia (if any) are not yet known). Finally, we also consider the effects
of the potential EU enlargements by the candidate countries (Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Turkey) using population projections for 2020. The key results can be summarized as follows:
 Obviously, with each EC (EU) accession the power of the incumbent member states was
reduced as evident from the downward trend in member states’ power indices.
 Clearly, the largest power is held by the large EU member states. However, the power
indices of Germany (7.78% in terms of the BFI for the current regime, EU27 QMV), France
(7.78%), Italy (7.78%), the United Kingdom (7.78%) and Spain (7.42%), are well below
their population shares (16.62%, 12.85%, 11.94%, 12.27% and 8.98%, respectively) as shown
in Table 2. The largest disproportionality (relative to the population shares) is shown by
Germany. This qualitative result also holds up for the SSI in Table 3 and also for the
remaining normalized indices reported in Table A.9 in Appendix A1.
 As a mirror image, the smaller member states show more than proportional power indices:
e.g., the power indices of Malta (0.82% in terms of the SSI for the current regime, EU27
QMV), Cyprus (1.1%) and Estonia (1.1%) are much larger than their respective population
shares (0.08%, 0.16% and 0.27%, respectively). But also medium-sized countries such as
Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden have
power indices which are well above their population shares. This qualitative result also
holds up for the BFI reported in Table 2 and the remaining normalized indices reported in
Table A.9 in the Appendix.
 Regarding the evolution of the relative positions of the incumbent member states, we can see
that the positions of the large players (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom)
remained virtually unchanged over the period 1973-10/2004. This also evident from the
fact that Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom held the same number of votes
throughout that period.
 With the introduction of the double majority voting system through the Treaty of Lisbon, we
observe a reduction (though no elimination) of the disproportionality in the weighted QMV
16The only differences arises from the Demographic Clause and the fact that the indices reported for the
period 2007-10/2014 are based on 2007 population figures, whereas the indices for the period 11/2014-
3/2017 are based on 2015 population forecasts. We have calculated both variants and the results for the
QMV regime turned out virtually identical.
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system in place up to 2014 (2017). For instance, the power index of Germany increases from
7.78% to 10.24% (in terms of the BFI), though it is still under its population share. On
average, large EU countries gain relatively more in terms of power from the DMV system
than small countries: This move towards proportionality will also be reflected in the results
for the power gradients below.
 While the EU-accession of Croatia will have quantitatively only minor consequences, Turkey
will - in case of its EU accession - appear as one of the most powerful players in the Council
with a power index of 8.5% (10.72%) according to the BFI (SSI), which is close to Germany
with 9.67% (12.59%) and larger than the power of the United Kingdom with 8.13% (10.15%).
In terms of the BFI (SSI), Turkey would be the third (second) largest player, following Ger-
many and France among the (potential) 32 member states. In terms of inclusiveness (4.04%),
Turkey would appear as second largest player in the Council behind Germany (4.24%) and
before France (4.01%).
 Regarding the other indices shown in Appendix A1, there are several common qualitative
results: i) a downward trend in power through the entry of new member states, ii) a stable
relative power distribution among incumbent member states, iii) a disproportionality between
power and population shares, favoring relatively small countries, which has been partly re-
duced through the DMV by the Treaty of Lisbon. However, there are also differences. In
terms of the DPI and HPI, which consider minimal coalitions only, the disproportionality
is more pronounced in quantitative terms. A similar result holds for the inclusiveness index,
which measures the potential gains from voting and ignores whether a country is critical in
a winning coalition. Specifically, the normalized version of the inclusiveness index shows a
sharp decline for the incumbent (big) member states due to enlargements till EU25 (11/2004-
06). Thereafter, the declining trend is less pronounced and the normalized inclusiveness index
ranges between 2.8% and 5.2% with an average of 3.62%.
2.2. Results for the EU Council of Ministers as a Whole
Having considered the power of EU member states, we now turn to the results for the EU Council
of Ministers as a whole. Table 4 gives an overview of the evolution of the EU’s efficiency defined
by EBFI (Coleman’s measure of capability to act, see equation (16a)) and ESSI (the Shapley-
Shubik analog, see equation (16b)) and the proportionality in terms of the power gradient (PG)for
alternative power indices (see equation (20)).
 As can be seen from Table 4, the EU’s capability to act (in the Council of Ministers) declined
over time in terms of both efficiency measures EBFI and ESSI , mainly as a results of EC
(EU) enlargements by further countries. This downward trend in efficiency is also illustrated
in Figure 2.
 The downward trend is much more pronounced for the Coleman measure (that relies on
the Banzhaf assumptions): According to EBFI , the passage probability of a vote reached a
minimum of 2 percent under the Nice Treaty for the EU27 (and the transitional period from
2014-2017 under the Lisbon Treaty). In stark contrast, the Shapley-Shubik analog (ESSI)
suggests no reason to be worried; in fact, the index ESSI has only slight decreased since the
treaties of Rome till 2014 (2017) to a value of 27.5 percent. This highlights the relevance of
the distributional assumptions regarding voting behavior for the quantification of the EU’s
capability to act.
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Table 4: The EU Council of Ministers: Efficiency and Proportionality, 1958-2007
Efficiency (%) Power Gradient (%)
Regime Period EBFI ESSI PGBFI PGSSI PGJNI PGDPI PGHPI PGINC
EC6 1958-72 21.88 35.00 44.81 41.99 38.04 27.18 22.24 14.94
EC9 1973-80 14.65 32.30 44.69 53.44 37.21 23.69 22.13 14.28
EC10 1981-85 13.67 32.14 46.32 58.74 36.28 14.88 13.16 14.44
EC12 1986-94 9.81 31.03 43.87 49.02 33.84 20.35 19.08 13.84
EU15 1995-4/2004 7.78 31.03 42.32 46.53 29.81 14.78 13.55 12.79
EU25 5/2004-10/04 3.49 30.49 37.11 42.95 23.67 10.89 10.20 10.41
EU25 11/2004-2006 3.59 29.19 48.87 55.35 33.99 13.44 12.56 12.89
EU27 2007-10/14 2.03 27.50 47.19 55.47 32.75 13.76 13.00 13.09
EU27, DMV 11/2014-3/17 16.62 37.80 50.96 77.25 27.38 15.53 15.50 9.80
EU28, DMV 11/2014- 15.73 36.79 63.20 87.14 35.71 18.84 18.76 11.47
EU32, DMV 2020 16.96 37.93 59.35 84.07 32.87 16.12 16.08 9.96
Notes: EBFI .. Coleman measure of capability to act, ESSI ... capability to act (Shapley-Shubik analog),
PG ... power gradients based on alterantive indices. (The PG based on CPI and CII are the same as
under the normalized Banzhaf and not shown in the Table.
 Both indices of the capability to act show an increase with the shift from the qualified
majority to the double majority voting that will come fully into force in 2017 (and co-exist
with weighted qualified majority voting for the period 11/2014-3/17). Efficiency in terms
of the EBFI index increases to a value of 16.6 percent under DMV for the EU27, whereas
its Shapley-Shubik analog even increases to 37.8 percent. Notably, this points to a passage
probability that is higher than under the treaties of Rome for the original six member states.
 Further accessions by Croatia (and the candidate countries) will slightly reduce efficiency but
have no sizeable effect on the EU’s capability to act.
 It is interesting to note that the switch to the double majority system and the increase in
efficiency goes hand in hand with a strong move towards proportionally. The power gradients
remained fairly flat till 2014 (2017) and increased towards proportionality thereafter, in
particular those based on the BFI and SSI.
 The sharpest increase in proportionality is shown by the power gradient based on the SSI
(as also apparent from the country-specific results) which is closest to proportionality with a
value of 50.96 under the current regime, EU27, 2007-10/2014 and 87.22 under the potential
enlargement to the EU32 in 2020; the lowest degree of proportionality is indicated by the
normalized inclusiveness and Holler-Packel index, which is in line with the country-specific
results reported in the Tables in Appendix A1.
Summing up, the conclusions regarding efficiency (and also) proportionality are rather different
under the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik approach. The latter indicates a much more efficient
and more proportional voting system. From a supranational perspective this is the most relevant
result. Hence it will be of particular interest in future research i) to judge the plausibility of the
distributional assumptions underlying the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik approach, and ii) to explore
the changes in efficiency (and proportionality) against variations in the distributional assumptions,
both in general terms and with respect to the EU Council of Ministers.
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Figure 2: The EU Council of Ministers: Efficiency (%) and Proportionality (%), 1958-2020
Notes: Proportionality is measured on the left vertical axis, efficiency on the right vertical axis.
2.3. The Role of Additional Legal Provisions
In the following, we discuss the changes in the quantitative measures implied by the additional
legal rules, namely the Demographic Clause and the Ioannina Compromise. As outlined above, the
Demographic Clause and the Ioannina Compromise are different in nature. Both are legal provi-
sions, but the Demographic Clause is a ‘hard legal fact’ that implies power to prevent (or initiate)
action while the Ioannina Compromise implies delaying power only and is more limited in scope.
Here, we focus on measures related to the Council of Ministers as a whole; country-specific power
indices without the Demographic Clause and accounting for the Ioannina Compromise are given in
Tables A.13-A.17 in the Appendices A2 and A3.
Demographic Clause
Regarding efficiency, it can be seen from Table 5 that the Demographic Clause for the EU27 regime
(compared to the current regime, EU27, QMV in Table 4), by adding an additional majority re-
quirement, does not change the capability to act in terms of EBFI or ESSI . Hence, in only a
negligible number of cases (relative to the large number of coalitions) does it appear to be the case
that the population treshold is decisive. Proportionality of the voting system also changed only
slightly by the Demographic Clause, raising the power gradient in terms of the PGBFI (PGSSI)
from 47.19 (55.47%) to 47.21% (55.52%). This can also be seen from the country-specific table in
Appendix A2, where the Demographic Clause on average reduces (increases) the power of small
(large) member states.
19
Table 5: Demographic Clause, Ioannina Compromise, Efficiency and Proportionality
Efficiency (%) Power gradients(%)
Regime Period EBFI ESSI PGBFI PGSSI PGJNI PGDPI PGHPI PGINC
Demographic Clause
EU27, QMV 2007-10/2014 2.03 27.50 47.19 55.47 32.75 13.76 13.00 13.09
without demographic clause 2.03 27.50 47.21 55.52 32.71 13.76 13.00 13.10
Ioannina Compromise
EU15 1995-04/2004 7.78 31.03 42.32 46.53 29.81 14.78 13.55 12.79
with Ioannina I 4.71 27.66 41.07 50.17 29.58 14.97 13.88 13.35
EU28
(DMV)
11/2014 15.73 36.79 63.20 87.14 35.71 18.84 18.76 11.47
with Ioannina II 7.03 33.37 56.02 65.64 30.49 12.65 11.12 12.57
with Ioannina III 2.19 28.33 62.42 43.31 36.37 11.92 9.38 15.58
EU32
(DMV)
2020- 16.96 37.93 59.35 84.07 32.87 16.12 16.08 9.96
with Ioannina III 2.11 30.12 49.62 39.37 25.9 6.84 5.41 12.41
Notes: Ioannina III comes into force in 2017, but its consequences are given for the EU27 in the period
11/2014-3/2017 to ensure comparability.
Ioannina Compromise
Table 5 also shows the implications of the three variants of the Ioannina Compromise for efficiency
and proportionality. For instance, in the case of EU28, the capability to act declines substantially
from 15.73% to 7.03% in terms of EBFI and from 36.79% to 33.37% in terms of ESSI . Since
the Ioannina comprose II gives a group of small countries additional power, it tends to decrease
the proportionality of the voting system, lowering the power gradient in terms of the PGBFI
(PGSSI) from 63.20% (87.14%) to 56.02% (65.64%). As with the Ionnina Compromise III an even
smaller number of countries is needed to form a blocking minority, the efficiency and proportionality
measures are decreased further. This can also be seen from the country-specific tables in Appendix
A3, where the Ioannina Compromise on average increases (reduces) the power of small (large)
member states.
3. EU Governance Reform during the Sovereign Debt Crisis
As a consequence of the euro area sovereign debt crises several reforms, most notably the so called
‘Six-Pack’ and ‘Two-Pack’ regulations, have been implemented at the European level. Table 6
summarizes the increasing complexity in EU decision-making that has come with these reforms.
On 13 December 2011, the revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) came into force with a new set
of rules for economic and fiscal surveillance. The so-called ‘Six-Pack’ is made up of five regulations
and one directive proposed by the European Commission and approved by all 27 member states and
the European Parliament in October 2011 (Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 to 1177/2011 and Council
Directive 2011/85/EU). It comprises an early warning mechanism related to measures of public
finance (and macroeconomic imbalances), triggering Council recommendations to take corrective
actions, and is backed up by enforcement measures in case of non-compliance under the so-called
excessive deficit (imbalances) procedure.
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Table 6: Increasingly Complex Decision-Making in the EU
‘Six-Pack’
Item
Regulation/
Directive No.
‘Six-Pack’ Regulation Applies to
Voting
Rule
1 1175/2011 Improving budgetary positions
and economic policies
EU27 (with minor exceptions
that apply to euro area+ERM2
countries)
1
2 1177/2011 Improving the excessive deficit
procedure
EU27, ECB surveillance only ap-
plies to euro area+ERM2 coun-
tries
N/A
3 2011/85/EU
(Directive)
Budgetary frameworks require-
ments
EU27, the UK does not have to
abide by Articles 5 to 7 (concern-
ing numerical fiscal rules)
N/A
4 1176/2011 Macroeconomic Imbalances EU27 2
5 1173/2011 Enforcing euro area budgetary
surveillance
euro area 2
6 1174/2011 Correcting excessive imbalances euro area 3
‘Two-Pack’
Item
Regulation No. ‘Two-Pack’ Regulation
1 385/2011 Surveillance for member states
with financial stability difficul-
ties
euro area 3
2 Common provisions for draft
budgetary plans and excessive
deficit correction
euro area in general (with mi-
nor exceptions for members sub-
ject to macro-economic adjust-
ment programmes or an exces-
sive deficit procedure)
3
Agreement
Fiscal Compact (TSCG) EU25 (the UK and the Czech
Republic are left out)
4
European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) Treaty
euro area 5
Notes: ECB ... European Central Bank, ERM ... Exchange Rate Mechanism. Voting rules: 1 = Qualified
Majority Voting (QMV), excluding the member state concerned (only euro area countries vote on euro area
members), Council can reject Commission recommendation by simple majority. 2 = QMV, excluding the
member state concerned. 3 = QMV of euro area countries, excluding the member state concerned. 4 =
Reversed QMV (euro area countries). 5 = QMV or mutual agreement by the Board of Directors and the
Board of Governors. See European Union (2011); Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012).
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Of particular interest in the present context are the changes related to the enforcement measures,
for which a reverse qualified majority voting procedure has been introduced in order ‘to take all the
relevant decisions leading up to sanctions. This semi-automatic decision-making procedure makes
it very difficult for member states to form a blocking majority.’ (European Union, 2011).
In case of a persistent failure to respect the rules of the pact, the Commission will draft a
recommendation to the member state to take corrective action, which is adopted by the Council
through a reverse qualified majority voting procedure, i.e., unless a qualified majority of member
states votes against it (see below).
For euro area member states, the recommendation will be backed by an enforcement mechanism
(based on Article 136 of the Treaty) in the form of an interest-bearing deposit amounting to 0.2%
of GDP, which can also be converted into a fine. These enforcement measures are also adopted by
reverse majority voting. In case the member state concerned faces a notice under Article 126(9), the
financial sanction will be adopted by qualified majority voting as foreseen by the Treaty. Table 7
gives an overview of the enforcement measures underpinning the Stability and Growth Pact and
the voting procedures.
Table 7: Enforcement Mechanisms under the Revised Stability and Growth Pact
Enforcement Measures Underpinning the SGP in the Euro Area
Trigger of the Sanction Sanction Adoption
Council decision establishing failure to take action in response to a
Council recommendation under Art. 121(4).
Interest-bearing
deposit (as a rule
0.2% of GDP)
Reverse Qualified
Majority Voting
Council decision based on Art.126(6) of the Treaty Non-interest-bearing
deposit
Reverse Qualified
Majority Voting
(i.e. existence of an excessive deficit), only if the Member States
had already lodged an interest-bearing deposit (i.e. in case of non-
compliance with the preventive arm provisions) or in case of partic-
ularly serious non-compliance with the rules
(as a rule 0.2% of
GDP)
Council decision based on Art.126(8) of the Treaty Fine
Reverse Qualified
Majority Voting
(i.e. non-effective action in response to the recommendation to cor-
rect the excessive deficit under Art. 126(7))
(as a rule 0.2% of
GDP)
Council decision based on Art.126(11) of the Treaty Fine
Qualified
Majority Voting(i.e. non-effective action in response to the notice to correct the
excessive deficit under Art. 126(9))
0.2% of GDP +
variable component)
Notes: See European Union (2011).
Most of the ‘Six-Pack’ reforms are based on the Lisbon Treaty and therefore perpetuate the clear
distinction between euro area and non-euro area countries. In particular, regulation 1175/2011 on
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions applies to the EU27, but the associated
sanctions refer to the euro area. Regulation 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroe-
conomic imbalances also applies to the whole EU. However, the alert mechanism, which is part of
the regulation, is, in accordance with Article 121(3) of the TFEU, discussed in the eurogroup for
the euro area countries. Finally, the enforcement mechanism to correct excessive macroeconomic
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imbalances adopted as part of the ‘Six-Pack’ is exclusively addressed to euro area countries (Regu-
lation 1174/2011). For the most part, the regulations require qualified majority voting (QMV) by
the Council to adopt a European Commission recommendation. For euro area countries, only euro
area countries vote. But as shown in Table 7 for some regulations more complex voting schemes
have been implemented.
Summing up, five main different voting regimes can arise from these new regulations, which
will be considered quantitatively in the following:
 The usual qualified majority vote (QMV) of all 27 member states (EU27),
 QMV with all 27 countries, excluding the member state concerned,
 Qualified majority vote of the 17 euro area countries,
 QMV with only euro area countries, excluding the member state concerned,
 reverse QMV (RQMV) with only euro area countries (excluding the member state concerned).
The voting weights and threshold percentages stay the same as before. The respective absolute
thresholds for majorities and total vote counts change though and are presented in Table 8. Thereby,
countries with identical number of votes (see Table A1 in the Appendix) are grouped together in
the respective rows, whereas the figures under voting without the member state concerned exclude
only one of these countries at a time.
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the EU27 and the Euro Area
We apply these changed thresholds and voting rules using the power measures introduced above.
Table 9 gives an overview the efficiency and proportionality of the EU Council of Ministers under
the various QMV regimes. Full tables with country-specific results are given in Appendix A4.
Independently of the underlying set of countries (EU27 or euro area) the exclusion of a country
increases the efficiency of the scheme relying on the Banzhaf measure (EBFI) and decreases for the
Shapley-Shubik analog (ESSI). This is another case in point where the two indices differ regarding
their implications for efficiency.17 Although the power gradients are only comparable within each
set of countries (EU27 and euro area) in Table 9, we see that proportionality increases for most of
the indices when medium sized countries are excluded, but decreases when small or big countries
are not allowed to vote.
17This result is in line with those of section II, where we found the Shapley-Shubik efficiency measure (ESSI)
to be much less sensitive against the accession of further countries.
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Table 9: Efficiency and Proportionality under Different QMV Regimes
Efficiency (%) Power Gradients (%)
Regime EBFI ESSI PGBFI PGSSI PGJNI PGDPI PGHPI PGINC
EU27 QMV
All 2.03 27.50 47.19 55.47 32.75 13.76 13.00 13.09
Excluding FR / DE / IT / UK 2.32 22.53 45.81 54.75 71.27 13.47 12.70 12.71
Excluding ES / PL 2.28 21.41 45.59 54.62 70.41 13.41 12.65 12.65
Excluding NL 2.37 22.28 47.66 55.32 69.34 13.78 12.97 13.10
Excluding RO 2.42 22.97 48.08 55.91 69.74 13.93 13.12 13.26
Excluding BE / CZ / GR / HU / PT 2.32 21.66 48.05 56.00 69.82 13.89 13.09 13.25
Excluding AT / BG / SE 2.36 22.56 47.52 55.62 69.42 13.94 13.15 13.26
Excluding DK / IE / FI / LT / SK 2.19 20.52 47.28 55.43 69.89 14.07 13.28 13.29
Excluding CY / EE / SI / LU / LV 2.15 20.79 46.93 55.09 69.68 13.74 12.95 13.25
Excluding MT 2.08 20.09 47.21 55.53 69.94 13.76 13.00 13.10
Only euro area countries QMV
All 6.25 93.67 49.93 58.46 69.22 14.83 13.34 13.80
Excluding FR / DE / IT 6.90 89.64 47.55 54.16 69.73 15.22 13.84 13.18
Excluding ES 7.26 91.31 49.05 54.48 71.68 15.41 13.88 13.41
Excluding NL 6.89 89.78 50.47 57.98 68.45 14.34 12.59 13.91
Excluding BE / GR / PT 7.13 91.19 51.44 59.86 69.80 14.61 12.88 14.12
Excluding AT 6.80 89.68 50.69 59.55 68.73 13.87 12.26 14.09
Excluding IE / FI / SK 6.71 89.28 51.34 60.19 69.50 15.72 13.97 14.33
Excluding CY / EE / SI / LU 6.61 89.34 50.40 60.52 69.30 16.05 14.39 14.24
Excluding MT 6.37 88.29 50.08 59.94 69.43 14.69 13.07 14.26
Notes: Results for voting regimes excluding a particular country are grouped by countries with identical
number of votes in QMV, whereas for the calculation only one country is excluded at a time. There is a
small (though quantitatively negigible) difference in the power gradients when excluding different countries
from one row (with the same number of votes), because population size differs across countries.
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Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (Reverse QMV) in the Economic Governance Package
One characteristic of the economic governance package is the use of a particular voting system that
is referred to as reverse qualified majority voting. Under this voting procedure proposed by the
Commission in the context of the economic governance package, a Commission recommendation is
deemed to be adopted unless the Council decides by qualified majority to reject the recommendation
within a given deadline that starts to run from the adoption of such a recommendation by the
Commission. The current rules for the calculation of a qualified majority are contained in Article
3 of Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions18.
Under reverse QMV, if the Council decides to vote on the Commission recommendation, the
weighted votes of member states as laid down by the Treaties will remain unchanged. Hence, the
‘acceptance treshold’ becomes a ‘prevention treshold‘ and the ‘acceptance treshold’ under reverse
QMV is equal to the total number of votes minus the number of votes required for preventing the
proposal plus one vote (see Table A8).
Table 10 gives an overview of member states’ power to prevent in terms of the Coleman measure
(CPI) and its Shapley Shubik analog (SPI) under the old regime (QMV) and the new regime
(reverse QMV). The lower panel also reports the implied efficiency of the Council of Ministers as a
whole.19
Table 10: Reverse Qualified Majority Voting Regime, Euro Area Countries
QMV Reverse QMV
CPI SPI CPI SPI
FR / DE / IT 84.55 53.24 5.64 9.98
ES 80.89 48.44 5.39 9.08
NL 41.33 23.12 2.76 4.33
BE / GR / PT 37.50 21.07 2.50 3.95
AT 32.37 17.53 2.16 3.29
IE / FI / SK 22.46 11.95 1.50 2.24
CY / EE / SI / LU 12.85 6.91 0.86 1.29
MT 9.77 5.11 0.65 0.96
EBFI ESSI
QMV 6.25 93.67
Reverse QMV 93.75 99.79
Notes: Results for voting regimes excluding a particular country are grouped by countries with identical
number of votes in QMV, whereas for the calculation only one country is excluded at a time. E.g., in the
first line the figures indicate Germany’s and Italy’s power to prevent action when France is excluded from
the voting, etc.
As expected Table 10 shows that the capability to act in terms of the Coleman measures of efficiency
sees a tremendous increase, as far more acceptance coalitions are possible with the much lower
threshold; to put it differently, much less blocking coalitions are possible. At the same time, the
18Different rules will apply from 1 November 2014 (see Article 16(4) TEU and Article 238(2) and (3) TFEU).
19Notice that that country-specific power measures, such as the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik index are not
changed numerically under the reverse QMV regime (with the same countries and weights), the only change
beeing that the interpretation becomes different: positive swings of a country making the coalition winning
in the sense that a Comission proposal can be successfully blocked.
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country-specific power to prevent proposals countries shrinks drastically due to the much higher
treshold requirement under the reverse QMV regime. The overall efficiency of the Council increases
dramatically both in terms of EBFI and ESSI . Hence, our quantitative results confirm that the
introduction of the reverse QMV mechanisms achieves the Commissions’ declared goal to introduce
a ‘semi-automatic decision-making procedure [that] makes it very difficult for member states to
form a blocking majority.’ (European Union, 2011).
IV Conclusions
This paper provide a comprehensive reassessment of the consequences of past treaty changes and
previous and upcoming (EC) EU enlargements for its member states’ power, the EU’s capability
to act (efficiency), and the overall proportionality of the voting mechanism in the EU Council
of Ministers. We employ the most widely used measures of power, such as the Banzhaf (1965)
and Shapley and Shubik (1954) indices, as well as alternative indices that have been suggested
in the literature. Regarding efficiency (the capability to act), we use Coleman’s (1971) measures,
which are based on the assumptions underlying the Banzhaf approach, and Shapley-Shubik analogs
more recently introduced by Paterson (2005). The overall proportionality of the voting system is
also judged in terms of the power gradient (Paterson, 1998).
Moreover, we also judge the relevance of additional legal provisions that have been in place in
addition to the standard qualified majority voting regime, namely the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’,
the ‘Demographic Clause’, and the ‘Ioannina Compromise’, as well as more recently introduced
enforcement mechanisms under the revised Stability and Growth Pact such as reverse qualified
majority voting.
Our results show in quantitative terms, how the accession of new member states over time has
diluted voting power of the incumbents and led to a reduction in the EU’s capability to act, which
has been resurrected by the introduction of the double majority voting system in the Lisbon Treaty.
While the results implied by alternative power indices show many similarities, there are large
differences between the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik approach when it comes to measuring the
EU’s capability to act. Hence, further theoretical and empirical research on the validity of the
assumptions underlying the two approaches seems warranted.
Regarding the extra rules we find the ‘Demographic Clause’ to be materially irrelevant in quan-
titative terms, whereas the ‘Ioannina compromise‘ provides small EU member state with additional
delaying power. We also highlight the increasing complexity and variety of voting rules in the EU
and quantify the large increase in efficiency implied by the introduction of the reverse majority
voting procedure in the area of economic governance.
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APPENDIX
A Voting Weights and Power Indices of EU Member
States, 1958-2020
Table A.1: Voting Weights under Qualified Majority Voting, 1958-2004
EC6 EC9 EC10 EC12 EU15 EU25 EU25 EU27
1958-72 1973-80 1981-85 1986-94 1995-
4/2004
05/2004-
10/2004
11/2004-
2006
2007-
10/2014
Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 5 12 12
France 4 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Germany 4 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Italy 4 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 5 13 13
Denmark - 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Ireland - 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Un. Kingdom - 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Greece - - 5 5 5 5 12 12
Portugal - - - 5 5 5 12 12
Spain - - - 8 8 8 27 27
Austria - - - - 4 4 10 10
Finland - - - - 3 3 7 7
Sweden - - - - 4 4 10 10
Cyprus - - - - - 2 4 4
Cz. Republic - - - - - 5 12 12
Estonia - - - - - 3 4 4
Hungary - - - - - 5 12 12
Latvia - - - - - 3 4 4
Lithuania - - - - - 3 7 7
Malta - - - - - 2 3 3
Poland - - - - - 8 27 27
Slovakia - - - - - 3 7 7
Slovenia - - - - - 3 4 4
Bulgaria 10
Romania 14
Total 17 58 63 76 87 124 321 345
Majority rules QMV QMV QMV QMV QMV QMV QMV QMV,
DMV
Treshold 12 41 45 54 62 88 232 255
% 70.6 70.7 71.4 71.1 71.3 71 72.3 73.9
Notes: QMV ... qualified majority voting, DMV ... double majority voting (55% of MS, 65% of
population) . After the transitional period from 11/2014-03/2017, weighted voting will be replaced by
double majority voting.
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A1 Country-Specific Power Measures by Regime (Time Period)
Table A.2: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EC6 (1958-1972)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 4.75 14.29 15.00 15.38 16.00 18.75 20.00 15.87 71.43
France 24.48 23.81 23.33 23.08 22.67 20.83 20.00 19.05 85.71
Germany 38.16 23.81 23.33 23.08 22.67 20.83 20.00 19.05 85.71
Italy 26.24 23.81 23.33 23.08 22.67 20.83 20.00 19.05 85.71
Luxembourg 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 50.00
Netherlands 6.21 14.29 15.00 15.38 16.00 18.75 20.00 15.87 71.43
Notes: BFI ... Banzhaf index (which is equal to the normalized Coleman measures CPI and CII), SSI ... Shapley-Shubik
index, CPI ... Coleman power to prevent index, CII ... Coleman power to initate action index, SPI ... power to prevent
index (Shapley-Shubik analog), JNI .. Johnston index, DPI ... Deegan-Packel index, HPI ... Holler Packel index, INC ...
inclusiveness. All indices are normalized; only inclusiveness in reported both as normalized (INC) and as absolute index
(INCa). Population shares (POP ) are based on average population over the period 1958-1972 (Source: Eurostat).
Table A.3: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EC9 (1973-1980)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 3.56 9.15 8.10 7.85 10.03 11.47 11.72 10.48 69.33
France 19.20 16.72 17.86 18.11 15.74 14.00 13.79 12.90 85.33
Germany 28.49 16.72 17.86 18.11 15.74 14.00 13.79 12.90 85.33
Italy 20.19 16.72 17.86 18.11 15.74 14.00 13.79 12.90 85.33
Luxembourg 0.13 1.58 0.95 0.82 1.76 3.47 3.45 8.06 53.33
Netherlands 4.99 9.15 8.10 7.85 10.03 11.47 11.72 10.48 69.33
Denmark 1.84 6.62 5.71 5.51 7.60 8.80 8.97 9.68 64.00
Ireland 1.17 6.62 5.71 5.51 7.60 8.80 8.97 9.68 64.00
Un. Kingdom 20.41 16.72 17.86 18.11 15.74 14.00 13.79 12.90 85.33
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on average population over the period 1973-1980
(Source: Eurostat).
31
Table A.4: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EC10 (1981-1985)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 3.41 8.20 7.14 6.90 9.02 9.34 9.39 9.44 68.57
France 18.92 15.77 17.38 17.72 14.48 11.86 11.65 11.80 85.71
Germany 27.08 15.77 17.38 17.72 14.48 11.86 11.65 11.80 85.71
Italy 19.59 15.77 17.38 17.72 14.48 11.86 11.65 11.80 85.71
Luxembourg 0.13 4.10 3.02 2.81 5.01 8.18 8.41 8.16 59.29
Netherlands 4.97 8.20 7.14 6.90 9.02 9.34 9.39 9.44 68.57
Denmark 1.77 4.10 3.02 2.81 5.01 8.18 8.41 8.16 59.29
Ireland 1.21 4.10 3.02 2.81 5.01 8.18 8.41 8.16 59.29
Un. Kingdom 19.53 15.77 17.38 17.72 14.48 11.86 11.65 11.80 85.71
Greece 3.40 8.20 7.14 6.90 9.02 9.34 9.39 9.44 68.57
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on average population over the period 1981-1985
(Source: Eurostat).
Table A.5: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EC12 (1986-1995)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.91 6.66 6.37 6.33 7.42 8.08 8.19 7.81 68.41
France 16.50 12.87 13.42 13.51 11.77 10.37 10.23 9.76 85.57
Germany 23.13 12.87 13.42 13.51 11.77 10.37 10.23 9.76 85.57
Italy 16.55 12.87 13.42 13.51 11.77 10.37 10.23 9.76 85.57
Luxembourg 0.11 1.80 1.18 1.09 2.09 3.67 3.72 6.27 54.98
Netherlands 4.35 6.66 6.37 6.33 7.42 8.08 8.19 7.81 68.41
Denmark 1.50 4.59 4.26 4.21 5.34 6.50 6.60 7.15 62.69
Ireland 1.03 4.59 4.26 4.21 5.34 6.50 6.60 7.15 62.69
Un. Kingdom 16.69 12.87 13.42 13.51 11.77 10.37 10.23 9.76 85.57
Greece 2.97 6.66 6.37 6.33 7.42 8.08 8.19 7.81 68.41
Portugal 2.92 6.66 6.37 6.33 7.42 8.08 8.19 7.81 68.41
Spain 11.34 10.89 11.13 11.16 10.47 9.54 9.40 9.14 80.10
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on average population over the period 1986-1995
(Source: Eurostat).
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Table A.6: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU15 (1995-04/2004)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.72 5.87 5.52 5.46 6.43 6.47 6.50 6.43 69.09
France 15.67 11.16 11.67 11.74 9.74 8.22 8.09 8.03 86.27
Germany 21.85 11.16 11.67 11.74 9.74 8.22 8.09 8.03 86.27
Italy 15.18 11.16 11.67 11.74 9.74 8.22 8.09 8.03 86.27
Luxembourg 0.11 2.26 2.07 2.05 2.75 4.40 4.50 5.34 57.36
Netherlands 4.21 5.87 5.52 5.46 6.43 6.47 6.50 6.43 69.09
Denmark 1.41 3.59 3.53 3.51 4.33 5.72 5.82 5.74 61.67
Ireland 1.01 3.59 3.53 3.51 4.33 5.72 5.82 5.74 61.67
Un. Kingdom 15.63 11.16 11.67 11.74 9.74 8.22 8.09 8.03 86.27
Greece 2.89 5.87 5.52 5.46 6.43 6.47 6.50 6.43 69.09
Portugal 2.72 5.87 5.52 5.46 6.43 6.47 6.50 6.43 69.09
Spain 10.73 9.24 9.55 9.60 8.60 7.51 7.43 7.45 80.03
Austria 2.13 4.79 4.54 4.50 5.49 6.08 6.13 6.10 65.56
Finland 1.37 3.59 3.53 3.51 4.33 5.72 5.82 5.74 61.67
Sweden 2.36 4.79 4.54 4.50 5.49 6.08 6.13 6.10 65.56
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on average population over the period 1995-2004
(Source: Eurostat).
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Table A.7: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU25 (05/2004-10/2004)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.26 4.14 3.97 3.96 4.34 4.03 4.03 4.04 70.18
France 13.56 7.60 8.30 8.37 6.18 5.06 5.00 5.01 87.05
Germany 17.97 7.60 8.30 8.37 6.18 5.06 5.00 5.01 87.05
Italy 12.6 7.60 8.30 8.37 6.18 5.06 5.00 5.01 87.05
Luxembourg 0.10 1.69 1.57 1.56 2.10 3.26 3.31 3.35 58.25
Netherlands 3.54 4.14 3.97 3.96 4.34 4.03 4.03 4.04 70.18
Denmark 1.18 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Ireland 0.88 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Un. Kingdom 13.00 7.60 8.30 8.37 6.18 5.06 5.00 5.01 87.05
Greece 2.40 4.14 3.97 3.96 4.34 4.03 4.03 4.04 70.18
Portugal 2.28 4.14 3.97 3.96 4.34 4.03 4.03 4.04 70.18
Spain 9.22 6.36 6.51 6.53 5.56 4.68 4.63 4.66 80.99
Austria 1.77 3.38 3.25 3.24 3.76 3.81 3.82 3.83 66.48
Finland 1.14 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Sweden 1.95 3.38 3.25 3.24 3.76 3.81 3.82 3.83 66.48
Cyprus 0.16 1.69 1.57 1.56 2.10 3.26 3.31 3.35 58.25
Cz. Republic 2.22 4.14 3.97 3.96 4.34 4.03 4.03 4.04 70.18
Estonia 0.29 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Hungary 2.20 4.14 3.97 3.96 4.34 4.03 4.03 4.04 70.18
Latvia 0.50 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Lithuania 0.75 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Malta 0.09 1.69 1.57 1.56 2.10 3.26 3.31 3.35 58.25
Poland 8.32 6.36 6.51 6.53 5.56 4.68 4.63 4.66 80.99
Slovakia 1.17 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Slovenia 0.43 2.52 2.34 2.32 3.04 3.60 3.63 3.59 62.28
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population for 2004 (Source: Eurostat).
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Table A.8: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU25 (QMV, 11/2004-2006)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.26 3.91 3.65 3.62 4.29 3.97 3.97 3.98 67.52
France 13.56 8.57 9.29 9.37 7.04 5.26 5.18 5.20 88.37
Germany 17.97 8.57 9.29 9.37 7.04 5.26 5.18 5.20 88.37
Italy 12.60 8.57 9.29 9.37 7.04 5.26 5.18 5.20 88.37
Luxembourg 0.10 1.32 1.19 1.17 1.79 3.31 3.36 3.29 55.93
Netherlands 3.54 4.23 3.98 3.96 4.49 4.05 4.04 4.06 68.95
Denmark 1.18 2.31 2.10 2.07 2.89 3.57 3.60 3.55 60.33
Ireland 0.88 2.31 2.10 2.07 2.89 3.57 3.60 3.55 60.33
Un. Kingdom 13.00 8.57 9.29 9.37 7.04 5.26 5.18 5.20 88.37
Greece 2.40 3.91 3.65 3.62 4.29 3.97 3.97 3.98 67.52
Portugal 2.28 3.91 3.65 3.62 4.29 3.97 3.97 3.98 67.52
Spain 9.22 8.13 8.61 8.67 6.80 5.12 5.05 5.09 86.41
Austria 1.77 3.27 3.02 3.00 3.76 3.81 3.82 3.81 64.65
Finland 1.14 2.31 2.10 2.07 2.89 3.57 3.60 3.55 60.33
Sweden 1.95 3.27 3.02 3.00 3.76 3.81 3.82 3.81 64.65
Cyprus 0.16 1.32 1.19 1.17 1.79 3.31 3.36 3.29 55.93
Cz. Republic 2.22 3.91 3.65 3.62 4.29 3.97 3.97 3.98 67.52
Estonia 0.29 1.32 1.19 1.17 1.79 3.31 3.36 3.29 55.93
Hungary 2.20 3.91 3.65 3.62 4.29 3.97 3.97 3.98 67.52
Latvia 0.50 1.32 1.19 1.17 1.79 3.31 3.36 3.29 55.93
Lithuania 0.75 2.31 2.10 2.07 2.89 3.57 3.60 3.55 60.33
Malta 0.09 0.99 0.89 0.88 1.35 2.81 2.87 3.21 54.42
Poland 8.32 8.13 8.61 8.67 6.80 5.12 5.05 5.09 86.41
Slovakia 1.17 2.31 2.10 2.07 2.89 3.57 3.60 3.55 60.33
Slovenia 0.43 1.32 1.19 1.17 1.79 3.31 3.36 3.29 55.93
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on average population over the period 2005-2006
(Source: Eurostat). Indices account for the demographic clause.
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Table A.9: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU27 (QMV, 2007-10/2014)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.14 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
France 12.85 7.78 8.69 8.77 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Germany 16.62 7.78 8.69 8.77 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Italy 11.94 7.78 8.67 8.75 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Luxembourg 0.10 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Netherlands 3.30 3.97 3.68 3.66 4.19 3.77 3.76 3.78 70.60
Denmark 1.10 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Ireland 0.87 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Un. Kingdom 12.27 7.78 8.69 8.77 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Greece 2.26 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Portugal 2.14 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Spain 8.98 7.42 8.00 8.05 6.19 4.78 4.72 4.73 88.46
Austria 1.67 3.09 2.82 2.79 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.53 66.03
Finland 1.07 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Sweden 1.84 3.09 2.82 2.79 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.53 66.03
Cyprus 0.16 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Cz. Republic 2.08 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Estonia 0.27 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Hungary 2.03 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Latvia 0.46 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Lithuania 0.68 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Malta 0.08 0.94 0.82 0.80 1.25 2.59 2.64 2.94 54.88
Poland 7.70 7.42 8.00 8.05 6.19 4.78 4.72 4.73 88.46
Slovakia 1.09 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Slovenia 0.41 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Bulgaria 1.55 3.09 2.82 2.79 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.53 66.03
Romania 4.35 4.26 3.99 3.97 4.36 3.85 3.83 3.86 72.08
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population in year 2007 (Source: Eurostat). Indices
account for the demographic clause.
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Table A.10: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU27 (11/2014-03/2017)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.21 2.94 2.46 2.37 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.56 59.45
France 13.06 8.40 10.86 11.31 6.18 5.14 5.14 4.61 77.01
Germany 15.93 10.24 13.74 14.38 6.75 5.68 5.68 4.96 82.90
Italy 12.16 7.91 10.07 10.46 5.99 5.00 5.00 4.51 75.42
Luxembourg 0.11 1.90 1.09 0.95 2.44 3.14 3.14 3.36 56.11
Netherlands 3.34 3.49 3.20 3.14 3.82 3.65 3.65 3.66 61.22
Denmark 1.11 2.40 1.73 1.62 3.01 3.31 3.31 3.45 57.70
Ireland 0.91 2.30 1.60 1.48 2.90 3.28 3.28 3.43 57.38
Un. Kingdom 12.62 8.16 10.48 10.89 6.09 5.07 5.07 4.56 76.24
Greece 2.25 2.96 2.48 2.39 3.49 3.48 3.48 3.56 59.51
Portugal 2.10 2.89 2.38 2.29 3.44 3.46 3.46 3.55 59.27
Spain 9.23 6.24 7.68 7.93 5.26 4.48 4.48 4.19 70.05
Austria 1.67 2.67 2.10 1.99 3.26 3.39 3.39 3.51 58.58
Finland 1.08 2.38 1.71 1.60 2.99 3.3 3.30 3.45 57.65
Sweden 1.91 2.79 2.26 2.16 3.37 3.43 3.43 3.53 58.98
Cyprus 0.17 1.93 1.12 0.98 2.47 3.16 3.16 3.36 56.21
Cz. Republic 2.10 2.89 2.38 2.29 3.44 3.46 3.46 3.55 59.28
Estonia 0.26 1.98 1.19 1.05 2.54 3.18 3.18 3.37 56.36
Hungary 1.96 2.82 2.29 2.19 3.39 3.44 3.44 3.53 59.05
Latvia 0.43 2.06 1.29 1.16 2.64 3.2 3.20 3.39 56.63
Lithuania 0.64 2.17 1.43 1.30 2.76 3.23 3.24 3.41 56.96
Malta 0.08 1.89 1.07 0.93 2.42 3.13 3.13 3.35 56.07
Poland 7.55 5.69 6.65 6.8 5.01 4.26 4.26 4.09 68.28
Slovakia 1.08 2.38 1.72 1.60 3.00 3.30 3.30 3.45 57.66
Slovenia 0.41 2.05 1.28 1.15 2.63 3.20 3.20 3.39 56.60
Bulgaria 1.45 2.56 1.95 1.85 3.17 3.36 3.36 3.48 58.24
Romania 4.18 3.91 3.78 3.74 4.05 3.77 3.77 3.74 62.56
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population projections for 2015 (Source: Eurostat).
Indices based on DMV regime.
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Table A.11: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU28 (11/2014-)
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.19 2.73 2.29 2.21 3.36 3.33 3.33 3.42 58.46
France 12.95 9.47 11.68 12.06 6.81 5.35 5.35 4.64 79.40
Germany 15.79 11.61 14.90 15.47 7.53 5.88 5.87 5.03 86.03
Italy 12.05 8.87 10.78 11.11 6.57 5.17 5.17 4.53 77.52
Luxembourg 0.11 1.40 0.70 0.59 1.92 2.90 2.90 3.18 54.34
Netherlands 3.31 3.44 3.18 3.13 3.81 3.54 3.55 3.55 60.67
Denmark 1.10 2.03 1.45 1.35 2.73 3.11 3.12 3.29 56.31
Ireland 0.90 1.90 1.30 1.20 2.58 3.07 3.08 3.27 55.91
Un. Kingdom 12.51 9.18 11.24 11.60 6.70 5.26 5.26 4.59 78.47
Greece 2.23 2.75 2.33 2.25 3.38 3.33 3.34 3.42 58.54
Portugal 2.09 2.66 2.21 2.13 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.41 58.25
Spain 9.15 6.81 8.02 8.24 5.62 4.62 4.61 4.16 71.15
Austria 1.65 2.38 1.88 1.79 3.07 3.22 3.22 3.36 57.40
Finland 1.07 2.01 1.43 1.33 2.71 3.11 3.11 3.29 56.25
Sweden 1.90 2.54 2.07 1.98 3.21 3.27 3.27 3.38 57.88
Cyprus 0.16 1.44 0.74 0.63 1.98 2.92 2.92 3.18 54.46
Cz. Republic 2.09 2.66 2.21 2.13 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.41 58.25
Estonia 0.26 1.50 0.82 0.70 2.07 2.94 2.95 3.20 54.65
Hungary 1.94 2.57 2.10 2.01 3.24 3.28 3.28 3.39 57.97
Latvia 0.43 1.60 0.94 0.84 2.21 2.98 2.98 3.21 54.98
Lithuania 0.63 1.74 1.10 0.99 2.38 3.02 3.02 3.24 55.39
Malta 0.08 1.38 0.68 0.57 1.90 2.88 2.88 3.17 54.29
Poland 7.49 5.61 6.73 6.91 5.07 4.13 4.13 3.94 67.42
Slovakia 1.08 2.02 1.43 1.33 2.71 3.11 3.11 3.29 56.26
Slovenia 0.41 1.59 0.93 0.82 2.20 2.98 2.98 3.21 54.95
Bulgaria 1.44 2.25 1.71 1.61 2.94 3.18 3.18 3.33 56.97
Romania 4.15 3.99 3.89 3.85 4.14 3.72 3.72 3.65 62.37
Croatia 0.85 1.87 1.26 1.16 2.55 3.06 3.07 3.26 55.82
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population projections for 2015 (Source: Eurostat)
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Table A.12: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU32 (2020- )
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 1.92 2.38 2.03 1.97 2.93 2.93 2.93 3.00 57.69
France 11.26 7.91 9.91 10.25 5.77 4.43 4.42 3.93 75.51
Germany 13.3 9.20 11.95 12.44 6.21 4.76 4.76 4.14 79.68
Italy 10.44 7.40 9.13 9.42 5.56 4.29 4.29 3.84 73.88
Luxembourg 0.10 1.35 0.70 0.59 1.88 2.63 2.63 2.83 54.34
Netherlands 2.86 2.9 2.71 2.68 3.25 3.08 3.08 3.09 59.37
Denmark 0.95 1.83 1.32 1.23 2.46 2.77 2.77 2.91 55.91
Ireland 0.80 1.75 1.21 1.12 2.37 2.75 2.75 2.89 55.64
Un. Kingdom 11.00 7.75 9.67 9.99 5.71 4.38 4.38 3.90 75.00
Greece 1.91 2.38 2.02 1.96 2.93 2.93 2.93 3.00 57.67
Portugal 1.78 2.30 1.93 1.86 2.88 2.91 2.91 2.99 57.43
Spain 7.96 6.02 6.96 7.09 4.94 3.88 3.88 3.61 69.44
Austria 1.43 2.10 1.67 1.59 2.71 2.85 2.85 2.95 56.78
Finland 0.93 1.82 1.3 1.22 2.45 2.77 2.77 2.91 55.87
Sweden 1.67 2.24 1.85 1.78 2.83 2.89 2.89 2.98 57.23
Cyprus 0.15 1.37 0.74 0.63 1.92 2.64 2.64 2.83 54.44
Cz. Republic 1.80 2.31 1.94 1.87 2.88 2.91 2.91 2.99 57.45
Estonia 0.22 1.42 0.79 0.69 1.97 2.66 2.66 2.84 54.57
Hungary 1.64 2.23 1.83 1.76 2.81 2.89 2.89 2.97 57.18
Latvia 0.36 1.49 0.89 0.79 2.08 2.68 2.68 2.85 54.82
Lithuania 0.53 1.59 1.01 0.92 2.19 2.71 2.71 2.87 55.14
Malta 0.07 1.33 0.68 0.57 1.85 2.63 2.63 2.82 54.29
Poland 6.37 5.26 5.45 5.46 4.51 3.76 3.75 3.48 66.96
Slovakia 0.93 1.82 1.30 1.22 2.45 2.77 2.77 2.91 55.87
Slovenia 0.36 1.49 0.89 0.79 2.08 2.68 2.68 2.85 54.82
Bulgaria 1.18 1.96 1.49 1.41 2.58 2.81 2.81 2.93 56.34
Romania 3.49 3.25 3.17 3.15 3.45 3.18 3.18 3.15 60.48
Croatia 0.72 1.70 1.15 1.06 2.32 2.74 2.74 2.89 55.48
Iceland 0.06 1.32 0.67 0.57 1.85 2.62 2.62 2.82 54.27
Turkey 13.40 9.27 12.07 12.56 6.24 4.78 4.78 4.16 79.90
Macedonia 0.34 1.48 0.88 0.78 2.06 2.68 2.68 2.85 54.79
Montenegro 0.11 1.35 0.71 0.6 1.89 2.64 2.64 2.83 54.36
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population projections for 2020 (Source: Eurostat).
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A2 Implications of the Demographic Clause
Table A.13: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU27 (2007-10/2004) - Without Demo-
graphic Clause
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.14 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.1
France 12.85 7.78 8.67 8.76 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Germany 16.62 7.78 8.67 8.76 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Italy 11.94 7.78 8.67 8.76 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Luxembourg 0.10 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Netherlands 3.30 3.97 3.68 3.66 4.19 3.77 3.76 3.78 70.60
Denmark 1.10 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Ireland 0.87 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Un. Kingdom 12.27 7.78 8.67 8.76 6.39 4.90 4.83 4.84 90.34
Greece 2.26 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Portugal 2.14 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Spain 8.98 7.42 8.00 8.05 6.19 4.78 4.72 4.73 88.46
Austria 1.67 3.09 2.82 2.79 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.53 66.03
Finland 1.07 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Sweden 1.84 3.09 2.82 2.79 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.53 66.03
Cyprus 0.16 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Cz. Republic 2.08 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Estonia 0.27 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Hungary 2.03 3.68 3.41 3.38 4.01 3.69 3.69 3.70 69.10
Latvia 0.46 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Lithuania 0.68 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Malta 0.08 0.94 0.82 0.80 1.25 2.59 2.64 2.94 54.88
Poland 7.70 7.42 8.00 8.05 6.19 4.78 4.72 4.73 88.46
Slovakia 1.09 2.18 1.96 1.94 2.68 3.29 3.32 3.28 61.30
Slovenia 0.41 1.25 1.10 1.09 1.65 3.03 3.07 3.02 56.48
Bulgaria 1.55 3.09 2.82 2.79 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.53 66.03
Romania 4.35 4.26 3.99 3.97 4.36 3.85 3.83 3.86 72.08
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A3 Implications of the Ioannina Compromise
Table A.14: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU15 (1995-04/2004) - Ioannina I
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.72 6.02 5.66 5.61 6.50 6.47 6.49 6.46 71.74
France 15.67 11.01 12.06 12.19 9.72 8.24 8.12 8.08 89.76
Germany 21.85 11.01 12.06 12.19 9.72 8.24 8.12 8.08 89.76
Italy 15.18 11.01 12.06 12.19 9.72 8.24 8.12 8.08 89.76
Luxembourg 0.11 2.48 1.85 1.77 2.99 4.55 4.66 5.31 58.98
Netherlands 4.21 6.02 5.66 5.61 6.50 6.47 6.49 6.46 71.74
Denmark 1.41 3.69 3.32 3.27 4.38 5.70 5.78 5.70 63.32
Ireland 1.01 3.69 3.32 3.27 4.38 5.70 5.78 5.70 63.32
United Kingdom 15.63 11.01 12.06 12.19 9.72 8.24 8.12 8.08 89.76
Greece 2.89 6.02 5.66 5.61 6.50 6.47 6.49 6.46 71.74
Portugal 2.72 6.02 5.66 5.61 6.50 6.47 6.49 6.46 71.74
Spain 10.73 9.27 9.36 9.37 8.62 7.58 7.50 7.51 83.47
Austria 2.13 4.55 3.98 3.92 5.20 5.97 6.02 5.98 66.43
Finland 1.37 3.69 3.32 3.27 4.38 5.70 5.78 5.70 63.32
Sweden 2.36 4.55 3.98 3.92 5.20 5.97 6.02 5.98 66.43
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on average population over the period 1995-2004
(Source: Eurostat).
41
Table A.15: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU28 (11/2014-) - Ioannina II
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.19 2.87 2.60 2.55 3.41 3.43 3.44 3.41 61.60
France 12.95 8.84 9.69 9.89 6.32 4.80 4.65 4.75 85.77
Germany 15.79 10.12 11.84 12.17 6.78 5.02 4.87 5.04 90.95
Italy 12.05 8.33 9.01 9.18 6.12 4.69 4.55 4.64 83.73
Luxembourg 0.11 1.52 1.37 1.32 2.12 3.08 3.14 3.11 56.15
Netherlands 3.31 3.60 3.30 3.25 3.83 3.61 3.60 3.58 64.57
Denmark 1.10 2.16 1.95 1.90 2.83 3.26 3.30 3.26 58.75
Ireland 0.90 2.03 1.83 1.78 2.70 3.23 3.28 3.23 58.22
Un. Kingdom 12.51 8.60 9.36 9.55 6.23 4.76 4.61 4.70 84.81
Greece 2.23 2.89 2.63 2.58 3.43 3.43 3.45 3.42 61.71
Portugal 2.09 2.80 2.54 2.49 3.36 3.41 3.43 3.40 61.32
Spain 9.15 6.61 7.08 7.20 5.39 4.17 4.08 4.25 76.74
Austria 1.65 2.52 2.28 2.23 3.15 3.35 3.37 3.34 60.19
Finland 1.07 2.14 1.93 1.88 2.81 3.26 3.30 3.25 58.67
Sweden 1.90 2.68 2.42 2.37 3.27 3.38 3.41 3.37 60.83
Cyprus 0.16 1.56 1.41 1.36 2.16 3.11 3.17 3.12 56.30
Cz. Republic 2.09 2.80 2.54 2.49 3.36 3.41 3.43 3.40 61.32
Estonia 0.26 1.62 1.46 1.41 2.24 3.13 3.19 3.13 56.56
Hungary 1.94 2.70 2.45 2.40 3.30 3.39 3.41 3.38 60.95
Latvia 0.43 1.73 1.56 1.51 2.37 3.16 3.21 3.16 56.99
Lithuania 0.63 1.86 1.68 1.63 2.52 3.19 3.24 3.19 57.53
Malta 0.08 1.50 1.36 1.31 2.09 3.07 3.13 3.11 56.08
Poland 7.49 6.12 6.43 6.49 5.18 3.96 3.89 4.14 74.78
Slovakia 1.08 2.15 1.93 1.89 2.82 3.26 3.30 3.25 58.69
Slovenia 0.41 1.72 1.55 1.50 2.36 3.16 3.21 3.16 56.95
Bulgaria 1.44 2.38 2.15 2.10 3.03 3.31 3.35 3.30 59.63
Romania 4.15 4.17 3.87 3.82 4.14 3.73 3.71 3.71 66.89
Croatia 0.85 2.00 1.80 1.76 2.67 3.22 3.27 3.22 58.10
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population projections for 2015 (Source: Eurostat)
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Table A.16: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU28 (11/2014-) - Ioannina III
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 2.19 2.74 2.94 2.93 3.35 3.40 3.43 3.36 62.76
France 12.95 9.59 7.77 7.78 6.94 4.65 4.41 5.07 94.65
Germany 15.79 9.75 8.59 8.67 7.03 4.68 4.45 5.11 95.41
Italy 12.05 9.44 7.44 7.43 6.86 4.65 4.42 5.04 93.96
Luxembourg 0.11 1.23 2.10 2.11 1.85 3.07 3.18 2.99 55.74
Netherlands 3.31 3.48 3.37 3.35 3.80 3.55 3.55 3.55 66.21
Denmark 1.10 1.96 2.50 2.50 2.68 3.26 3.33 3.17 59.13
Ireland 0.90 1.81 2.42 2.42 2.53 3.23 3.31 3.13 58.45
Un. Kingdom 12.51 9.53 7.62 7.61 6.91 4.65 4.42 5.06 94.36
Greece 2.23 2.77 2.96 2.95 3.36 3.41 3.44 3.37 62.89
Portugal 2.09 2.67 2.90 2.89 3.29 3.39 3.42 3.35 62.41
Spain 9.15 8.13 6.12 6.09 6.15 4.63 4.42 4.71 87.85
Austria 1.65 2.36 2.73 2.72 3.05 3.33 3.38 3.27 60.99
Finland 1.07 1.94 2.49 2.49 2.66 3.25 3.32 3.16 59.02
Sweden 1.90 2.53 2.82 2.82 3.19 3.36 3.40 3.31 61.80
Cyprus 0.16 1.28 2.12 2.13 1.91 3.10 3.20 3.00 55.94
Cz. Republic 2.09 2.67 2.90 2.89 3.29 3.39 3.42 3.35 62.42
Estonia 0.26 1.35 2.16 2.17 2.00 3.13 3.23 3.02 56.27
Hungary 1.94 2.57 2.84 2.83 3.22 3.37 3.41 3.32 61.95
Latvia 0.43 1.47 2.23 2.24 2.15 3.17 3.26 3.05 56.85
Lithuania 0.63 1.62 2.31 2.32 2.32 3.20 3.28 3.08 57.55
Malta 0.08 1.21 2.09 2.10 1.83 3.05 3.15 2.98 55.65
Poland 7.49 6.59 5.13 5.10 5.35 4.50 4.32 4.32 80.68
Slovakia 1.08 1.94 2.49 2.49 2.67 3.26 3.32 3.17 59.05
Slovenia 0.41 1.46 2.22 2.23 2.13 3.16 3.26 3.04 56.79
Bulgaria 1.44 2.21 2.64 2.63 2.91 3.30 3.36 3.23 60.27
Romania 4.15 3.94 3.71 3.69 4.07 3.64 3.62 3.66 68.33
Croatia 0.85 1.78 2.40 2.40 2.50 3.23 3.30 3.12 58.29
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population projections for 2015 (Source: Eurostat)
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Table A.17: Country-Specific Power Indices (%), EU32 (2020- ) - Ioannina III
Country POP BFI SSI SPI JNI DPI HPI INC INCa
Belgium 1.92 2.64 2.67 2.65 3.05 3.03 3.05 3.00 64.06
France 11.26 7.41 6.38 6.43 5.28 3.72 3.60 4.20 89.52
Germany 13.30 7.77 7.22 7.33 5.44 3.74 3.62 4.29 91.44
Italy 10.44 7.14 6.02 6.05 5.16 3.71 3.59 4.13 88.09
Luxembourg 0.10 1.49 1.96 1.95 2.07 2.91 2.96 2.72 57.96
Netherlands 2.86 3.2 3.03 3.01 3.36 3.09 3.09 3.14 67.04
Denmark 0.95 2.03 2.29 2.28 2.61 2.97 3.00 2.85 60.83
Ireland 0.80 1.94 2.23 2.22 2.52 2.96 3.00 2.83 60.33
Un. Kingdom 11.00 7.34 6.27 6.32 5.25 3.72 3.59 4.18 89.12
Greece 1.91 2.63 2.66 2.64 3.05 3.03 3.05 3.00 64.03
Portugal 1.78 2.55 2.61 2.59 3.00 3.02 3.04 2.98 63.59
Spain 7.96 5.76 4.71 4.70 4.54 3.61 3.50 3.78 80.7
Austria 1.43 2.33 2.47 2.46 2.84 3.00 3.02 2.93 62.42
Finland 0.93 2.02 2.28 2.27 2.59 2.97 3.00 2.85 60.75
Sweden 1.67 2.48 2.57 2.55 2.95 3.02 3.04 2.96 63.23
Cyprus 0.15 1.53 1.98 1.97 2.11 2.92 2.97 2.73 58.14
Cz. Republic 1.80 2.56 2.62 2.60 3.00 3.02 3.04 2.98 63.64
Estonia 0.22 1.57 2.01 2.00 2.16 2.93 2.97 2.74 58.38
Hungary 1.64 2.46 2.56 2.54 2.94 3.01 3.03 2.96 63.14
Latvia 0.36 1.66 2.06 2.05 2.25 2.93 2.98 2.76 58.84
Lithuania 0.53 1.77 2.12 2.11 2.36 2.95 2.99 2.79 59.42
Malta 0.07 1.48 1.95 1.94 2.05 2.90 2.95 2.71 57.87
Poland 6.37 4.57 3.94 3.93 4.01 3.37 3.30 3.49 74.35
Slovakia 0.93 2.02 2.28 2.27 2.59 2.97 3.00 2.85 60.75
Slovenia 0.36 1.66 2.06 2.05 2.25 2.93 2.98 2.76 58.84
Bulgaria 1.18 2.18 2.38 2.36 2.72 2.98 3.01 2.89 61.61
Romania 3.49 3.57 3.27 3.25 3.55 3.13 3.12 3.24 69.02
Croatia 0.72 1.88 2.20 2.19 2.47 2.96 2.99 2.81 60.05
Iceland 0.06 1.47 1.94 1.93 2.04 2.90 2.95 2.71 57.84
Turkey 13.40 7.78 7.26 7.37 5.45 3.75 3.62 4.29 91.50
Macedonia 0.34 1.65 2.05 2.04 2.24 2.93 2.98 2.76 58.78
Montenegro 0.11 1.50 1.96 1.95 2.08 2.91 2.96 2.72 58.00
Notes: See Table A.2. Population shares are based on population projections for 2020 (Source: Eurostat).
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